Philosophy¶

Last updated: 2026-04-11

Recent Finds¶

Stoicism, Mindfulness, and the Brain: Empirical Foundations of Second-Order Desires (Frontiers in Psychology, Apr 2025)¶

Wittmann, Montemayor & Dorato challenge the popular neuroscientific claim that free will is illusory, using Stoic moral psychology as the corrective lens. Their key move: Libet-type readiness-potential experiments only probe first-order desires (trivial, impulsive choices) — not the second-order desires (reflective, self-directed commitments) that Stoic practice actually targets. Genuine agency is a capacity cultivated over time through diachronic habituation — premeditatio malorum, the view-from-above, voluntary discomfort — not a binary on/off switch measurable in milliseconds. The result is an empirically-grounded compatibilism: Stoic practice is neurologically coherent, not pre-scientific wishful thinking. For anyone tracking philosophy-of-mind intersections with ancient ethics, this is the cleanest recent account of why neurodeterminism fails to refute Stoic agency.

Qualitative empirical study interviewing professionals across organizations, identifying three Neo-Stoic practices in workplace settings: (1) personal discipline under pressure, (2) contributing to a common good, (3) mentoring others in ethical conduct. The paper's counter-argument is important: corporate Stoicism is frequently criticized as neoliberal self-management in ancient clothing. The authors reroot it in Epictetus's oikeiōsis (appropriation toward the common good) and Seneca's civic virtue — showing that Stoicism has a deeply social dimension that popular renditions strip out. Embedded in social-ecological systems (SES) theory, they argue Neo-Stoic ethics pushes toward beyond-compliance sustainability behavior. This recasts Stoicism from a personal coping strategy to a structural ethical framework for organizations.

Plasticity and Neoplasticity in Malabou's Hegel (Continental Philosophy Review, 2025)¶

Quiñonez resolves a persistent ambiguity in Malabou's reading of Hegel: commentators conflate plasticity (the capacity to receive and give form — including through radical rupture) with neoplasticity (its pathological limit-case, as in traumatic brain injury). Conflating the two misreads Malabou's move from phenomenological example to ontological claim. The paper repositions Malabou's Hegel against Heidegger's reading of Hegelian temporality in Being and Time: plasticity offers a more dynamic, less teleological account of historical becoming than the Aufhebung traditionalists defend. Why it matters for broader continental philosophy: Malabou's work is the most serious recent attempt to bring German Idealism into dialogue with neuroscience and post-structuralism — getting the concept right matters for how that conversation develops.

On Singularity and the Stoics: Stoicism as a Framework for AI Risk (Springer AI & Ethics)¶

A peer-reviewed paper in AI and Ethics arguing that Stoic thought — particularly the dichotomy of control — offers practical tools for navigating AI risk that virtue ethics and utilitarian frameworks lack. The key Stoic contribution: distinguishing avoidable risks (training data, deployment choices, governance design) from unavoidable risks (emergent behavior, unpredictable societal uptake). This maps cleanly onto the Epictetan framework of "up to us / not up to us." The paper critiques techno-optimism as a form of philosophical naivety and techno-panic as a failure of prohairesis (rational agency). Contemporary application: Stoic acceptance is not passive — it is paired with intense focus on the zone of control.

Reading Camus "With," or After, Levinas: Rebellion and the Primacy of Ethics (Matthew Sharpe)¶

Sharpe's paper constructs a productive dialogue between Camus' absurdist rebellion and Levinas' ethics of the Other — two thinkers who, via completely different philosophical routes, arrive at the same halt on murder. Camus grounds the prohibition on violence in epistemological humility: we cannot know enough to justify killing. Levinas grounds it in the infinite ethical demand of the Other's face. The convergence is philosophically striking: rebellion (Camus) and responsibility-to-the-Other (Levinas) both resist totalitarianism without grounding ethics in a God or a system. The split: Camus stays in the realm of human solidarity; Levinas insists ethics precedes all ontology.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Marcus Aurelius ¶

The authoritative academic reference on Marcus Aurelius' life and philosophy. Covers his Stoic teachings, his role as Roman emperor-philosopher, and his Meditations — examining how Stoic principles integrated with practical governance under constant military pressure. Key insight: the Stoics did not separate theory from practice; the Meditations is a private journal of philosophical self-discipline, never written for publication.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Albert Camus ¶

Definitive entry on Camus' philosophy of the absurd and his explicit rejection of existentialism (despite frequent miscategorization). The absurd is the confrontation between human hunger for meaning and the universe's silence — not a conclusion but a starting point. Camus argues revolt (living fully in spite of meaninglessness) rather than philosophical suicide (religion) or literal suicide. His split with Sartre over political violence remains one of the sharpest ruptures in 20th-century French thought.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Seneca ¶

Comprehensive treatment of Seneca's Stoic ethics, centered on the proficiens (the moral practitioner, not the ideal Sage). His Letters to Lucilius are practical philosophy in epistolary form — on time management, destructive passions, the fear of death, and the tension between public life and philosophical withdrawal. His ethics-first approach contrasts with the more physics-heavy Stoicism of Chrysippus and is arguably more accessible as a practice.

Core Concepts¶

The Stoic Framework¶

Dichotomy of control (Epictetus): Divide all things into "up to us" (judgments, impulses, desires) and "not up to us" (body, reputation, property). Focus exclusively on the former.
Preferred indifferents: External goods (health, wealth, reputation) are neither good nor bad — they are preferred but not required for eudaimonia (flourishing).
Memento mori: Contemplating death is not morbid but clarifying — it strips away false urgency and reveals what matters.
The view from above (Marcus Aurelius): Mentally zoom out to the cosmic scale to dissolve the apparent importance of daily frustrations.
Amor fati (Nietzsche's extension): Not just acceptance of fate but love of it — everything that happens, even suffering, is necessary.

Absurdism (Camus)¶

The absurd is a relationship, not a property of the world alone. It arises between human longing for clarity and the world's irrational silence.
Three responses: suicide (giving up), philosophical suicide (religion, leaping to transcendence), or revolt — living fully in the face of the absurd.
Sisyphus as the absurd hero: "One must imagine Sisyphus happy."
Camus vs. existentialism: He rejects bad faith (Sartre), radical freedom, and especially political violence as justified means.

Continental Philosophy Landmarks¶

Phenomenology (Husserl, Heidegger): Philosophy starting from lived experience and consciousness, not abstract logic.
Existentialism (Sartre, de Beauvoir): Existence precedes essence — humans define themselves through choices; radical freedom entails radical responsibility.
Ethics of the Other (Levinas): Ethics as first philosophy; the face of the Other makes an infinite demand before any theory of the Good.
Plasticity (Malabou): Revision of Hegelian Aufhebung — change is not teleological synthesis but plastic reshaping, including destructive rupture (neoplasticity). Bridges German Idealism, neuroscience, and post-structuralism.

Open Questions¶

How does Stoic oikeiōsis (appropriation / natural affiliation) ground social ethics without appealing to external authority?
Can Camus' revolt be sustained as a genuine philosophical position, or does it eventually collapse back into either nihilism or theism?
What is the relationship between Stoic logos (universal reason) and contemporary secular moral realism?
Is there a coherent synthesis between Stoic acceptance and existentialist radical freedom?
Does the Camus/Levinas convergence on anti-violence hold under asymmetric cases (e.g., self-defense, resistance to genocide)? Where do they diverge?
How far can the Stoic dichotomy of control be operationalized in AI alignment practice — who defines the boundary between controllable and uncontrollable?